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Abstract: During the European financial crisis, the European Central Bank implemented a series of 
unconventional monetary policy measures. We argue that these unconventional monetary policy 
measures created soft budget constraints for the Eurozone countries by lowering their bond yield 
spreads. This hypothesis is tested using pooled OLS estimations and two different datasets: monetary 
policy event dummies and the purchase volumes of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). We find 
significantly negative effects on bond yield spreads for both datasets, leading us to accept the 
hypothesis. The results are confirmed by robustness checks that directly estimate the effect of 
unconventional monetary policy on central government debt. 
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The European sovereign debt crisis has led to a major debate on the limits and boundaries of 
European integration. From the very beginning, the European Central Bank has been playing a central 
role in combating the crisis. When its standard monetary policies were exhausted, it turned to non-
standard (unconventional) monetary policy measures. In this paper, we argue that the European 
Central Bank (ECB) softened the budget constraints of Eurozone governments by lowering their 
sovereign bond yield spreads. In an effort to combat the crisis, the ECB reduced its key interest rates to 
levels never seen before and altered the maturity as well as tender and allotment procedures of 
standard measures such as the main refinancing operations (MROs) and longer-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs). Moreover, it introduced several asset purchase programs. One of the most 
important was the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), which directly targeted sovereign bonds. 
These policy measures serve as the independent variables in our estimations.  
Given the Europeanization of monetary policies, Eurozone members have lost the option of 
monetary state financing and depend exclusively on financial markets to borrow. As a result, bond 
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yield spreads can become a binding constraint for incurring more debt when their levels surpass a 
certain threshold. The ECB can soften this constraint by keeping spreads low.  
We discuss the literature on soft budget constraints (SBCs) and on the European financial crisis 
and examine the effect of the ECB’s rescue policies on the sovereign debt levels of Eurozone 
governments. According to Kornai (1979, 1986), a soft budget constraint is present when a supporting 
organization (S-organization) is ready to rescue an entity with a budget constraint (BC-organization). So 
far, there has been a limited number of papers focusing on SBCs in currency unions. There are also 
conflicting views as to what effect currency unions have on the softness of budget constraints. Jahjah 
(2000) argues that a currency union can help harden the budget constraints, but, if member countries 
are fiscally weak and the central bank is not perfectly credible, rules and sanctions are needed to ensure 
fiscal discipline. Baskaran and Hessami (2013) suggest that Eurozone members nurtured bailout 
expectations after joining the currency union because they assumed other member countries could not 
afford their default for either political reasons or the fear of contagion. They show that after the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) was violated with impunity by France and Germany, other Eurozone members 
returned to their traditionally high debt levels thinking they would be bailed out if their debt became 
unsustainable. 
In this paper, we empirically test whether the ECB (as the S-organization) softened the budget 
constraints of Eurozone governments (as the BC-organizations) during the European financial crisis. To 
test this hypothesis, we estimate the effect of the unconventional monetary policies on bond yield 
spreads of Eurozone members. We find that these policies indeed significantly lowered spreads, which 
is also confirmed by robustness checks directly estimating the effect of unconventional monetary policy 
on central government debt levels.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a literature discussion 
tracing the evolution of the US financial crisis from the credit and housing bubbles to its spillover to 
Europe, the development of the European sovereign debt crisis, and the monetary policy responses of 
the ECB. Furthermore, the theory of SBCs and its empirical applications are discussed. Section 3 
presents the datasets used in our estimations. The empirical strategy is described in section 4. Section 5 








As has been the case with many financial crises, the US subprime crisis in 2007-08 was 
“preceded by financial liberalization”, but its idiosyncratic aspect was the prominent role of the shadow 
banking system (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008: 342). Several international and US government decisions 
made subprime mortgage supply and demand increase substantially, which changed the business 
model of banks and drove them, in turn, to lobby for further regulatory changes favoring their new 
model (Blundell-Wignall et al., 2008). The regulatory and supervisory deficiencies resulted in the 
increased importance and prevalence of shadow banking (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011), 
higher leverage ratios, and the emergence of extremely sophisticated securitization (Acharya et al., 
2009). The view that loose monetary policy was an important cause of the housing boom is based on the 
observation that interest rates were very low in the early 2000s (Taylor, 2008, 2014; White, 2009).  
An alternative explanation is the prevalence of global imbalances and their associated capital 
flows—also known as the global savings glut hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005). It describes the phenomenon 
of capital flows from developing and transition economies in Asia and Eastern Europe to the advanced 
economies (North America, Western Europe, Australia) that brought about too low risk premiums and 
false expectations regarding long-term volatility (Acharya et al., 2009). This hypothesis is tested 
empirically by Merrouche and Nier (2010), who find that capital inflows had a sizeable and statistically 
strong effect on financial sector imbalances in OECD countries between 1999 and 2007. Moreover, 
Merrouche and Nier find no significant effect of monetary policy on financial sector imbalances. 
Similarly, Bernanke (2010) finds a significant relationship between capital inflows and house price 
appreciation which explained about one third of house price growth. 
When the subprime crisis in the United States developed into a full-fledged financial crisis, it 
also spread to countries exposed to US securities markets (Dakic, 2014). In Europe, the major banks not 
only held a large number of asset-backed securities in the US market, but were also dependent on the 
US dollar supply. As a result, the crisis spilled over to Europe with about the same magnitude (Lane, 
2012).3 This spillover was exacerbated by the fact that several peripheral EU countries suffered from 
credit booms and housing bubbles of their own, with the most pronounced booms in Greece, Ireland, 
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and Spain (Darvas, 2012; Lane, 2012; Taylor, 2014).4 These twin booms turned into a crisis and, hence, 
huge capital outflows, liquidity shortages, and increasing loan losses for European banks. The 
combination of domestic contraction in the real economy and financial markets as well as distress in 
international capital markets created a European banking crisis and set the grounds for sovereign debt 
crises (ECB, 2012a; Lane, 2012). 
The incentives toward high debt levels prior to the crisis were mainly induced by three 
parameters. First, in early 2000s, the financial markets assumed the full real convergence of the 
Eurozone to the German economy and priced their sovereign bonds on the same level (Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas, 2010: 3). As Mody and Sandri (2012) point out, the homogeneity of sovereign bond yield 
spreads was already questionable at that time and unrealistic after 2008. Hence, southern European 
countries enjoyed excessively low interest rates and could borrow as cheaply as never before, which 
they also did extensively (Arestis and Sawyer, 2011; Lane, 2012). Second, the elimination of national 
currencies gave national fiscal policies a higher significance as an instrument for countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies (Lane, 2012). Third, the two pillars of the European treaties with respect to 
over-borrowing by member-states, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the “no bailout”-clause, 
proved to be insufficient. By 2011 about half of the original EU member states exceeded the 3 percent 
limit for government deficits at least once (Arestis and Sawyer, 2011). 
In response to the European sovereign debt crisis, the ECB introduced a variety of standard and 
non-standard (unconventional) monetary policy measures.5 The ECB conducts monetary policy using 
three standard instruments: standing facilities, open market operations, and the minimum reserve 
system (Pattipeilohy et al., 2013). During the crisis, it reduced interest rates to unprecedentedly low 
levels (ibid.). Furthermore, in the first phase of the crisis, it primarily changed the composition of its 
balance sheet (qualitative easing), whereas in the second phase it also strongly expanded it (quantitative 
easing) (Lenza, et al., 2010). The great majority of non-standard ECB measures used were directed at 
banks because of their high importance in credit creation, particularly of private credit (European 
Central Bank, 2011a; Lenza, et al., 2010). 
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The first period, between August 2007 and the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
was characterized by increased demand for liquidity. Thus, the ECB adopted primarily three non-
standard measures: de facto unlimited overnight liquidity, temporary swap lines, and supplementary 
LRTOs with prolonged maturities (Ibid.). The period after the failure of Lehman Brothers in mid-
September 2008 was characterized by panic in financial markets and rocketing interest rate spreads 
(Lenza et al., 2010). One of the main problems was that the solvency of many financial institutions 
became questionable, which endangered the stability of the financial sector as a whole (ibid.). 
Furthermore, the rise in money market spreads could lead to deleveraging by credit institutions and, 
thus, to negative spillovers to the real economy (European Central Bank, 2011a). In October 2008, the 
ECB implemented the Enhanced Credit Support program in order to help the banks manage their 
illiquid assets through increased central bank intermediation (European Central Bank, 2011a; Lenza et 
al., 2010). A key element of that program was a line of outright purchases, the Covered Bond Purchase 
Programme (CBPP). The CBPP was from the outset limited with respect to its duration and the volume 
of bonds that could be bought (European Central Bank, 2009).6 
When bond yields of peripheral Eurozone members rose dramatically, the ECB adopted the 
Securities Markets Programme (SMP) (European Central Bank, 2011a). Purchases were limited to 
secondary markets and fully sterilized (ibid.). This program ended with the announcement of Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) (European Central Bank, 2015a). During its duration, sovereign bonds of 
Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal were bought with the total nominal volume of holdings at 
the end of 2012 amounting to 218bn € (European Central Bank, 2013). Despite severe doubts whether 
these programs were permitted by the European treaties, the prevailing opinion is that the ECB acted 
within the limits of its mandate (Sester, 2012). 
Furthermore, in June 2014, the ECB announced a series of non-standard targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTROs) to support bank lending to the non-financial private sector in the EU 
(European Central Bank, 2015b). It also expanded its outright purchases under the expanded Asset 
Purchase Programme (APP) (European Central Bank, 2015a). This program comprises the CBPP3, the 
Asset-backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP), and the Public Sector Purchase Programme 
(PSPP) (ibid.).7 These liquidity measures, introduced by the ECB from late 2008 onwards, have had a 
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strong effect on short-term interest rates and thus helped sustain the functioning of the financial market 
and restore the confidence of its participants.8 
In this paper, we argue that the non-standard monetary policy of the ECB unintendedly created 
soft budget constraints (SBCs) for the Eurozone economies. The concept of SBCs was first formulated by 
Kornai (1979) in a paper analyzing the origins of chronic shortages in socialist economies. In his 
definition, a budget constraint becomes soft if it is negotiable such that a firm consistently spends more 
than it receives through sales and credit. Under SBCs, unprofitability does not lead to the bankruptcy of 
the firm, because the state insures its survival with constantly renegotiated credit (Kornai, 1979). Kornai 
(1986) soon broadened the context of the soft budget constraint and demonstrated that not only state-
owned firms in socialist economies, but also privately owned firms in capitalist economies are provided 
with SBCs by their governments. 
The seminal paper by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) defines the provision of soft budget 
constraints as a dynamic commitment problem in which an S-organization cannot credibly commit 
itself to not extending credit to a BC-organization. In central planning, SBCs either decrease firms’ 
sensitivity to prices, which then leads to shortages, or they suppress incentives to screen out poor 
projects, which hinders productive innovation. In transition economies, the persistence of SBCs 
instigated privatization of banks or institutional changes in the direction of decentralization and 
increased competition among regional governments (Qian and Roland, 1998). When banks function as 
BC-organizations and the government or the central bank is the S-organization, SBCs can arise either 
because of the role of private banking in credit provision or for political reasons such as keeping 
unprofitable firms afloat to support employment (Kornai et al., 2003). 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) offer a comprehensive review on the prevalence of SBCs in the 
context of restructuring enterprises in transition economies. Berglof and Roland (1998) and Mitchell 
(2000) review several sources of SBCs as well as appropriate mechanisms for hardening them in 
commercial banking. Nonprofit organizations such as schools, universities, and hospitals also face 
SBCs; most of the SBC studies here focus on the health sector (Babczuk and Kachniarz, 2012; Crivelli et 
al., 2010). Grigoriadis (2011) introduces the concept of SBCs in explaining the effectiveness of EU 
development aid in Russia, Ukraine, and Central Asia during transition (1991-2007). Sinelnikov-
Murylev et al. (2006) conduct an extensive review of decentralization policies in the United States, 
Canada, Germany, Norway, China, Brazil, Argentina, Hungary, and Ukraine and conclude that SBCs 
                                                          
8 On the effectiveness of ECB non-standard monetary policy, see Altavilla et al. (2014), Pattipeilohy et al. (2013), 
Kilponen et al. (2015), Eser and Schwaab (2015), and De Pooter et al (2015).  
7 
are an inherent problem of every decentralized fiscal system. Similar findings are derived by 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2010) for Sweden and by Baskaran (2012) for Germany.  
Furthermore, SBCs are relevant for monetary policy and currency unions. It is not new for 
national governments to ask for financial support from the international community. In the past, the 
IMF has usually taken on the role of international crisis manager and lender of last resort (Fischer, 
1999). National governments in currency unions, in particular, lack the policy instrument of currency 
devaluation and hence they have to turn to the central bank or other member states for potential 
bailouts. So far, there have only been very few studies explicitly dealing with SBCs in currency unions, 
where member states are BC-organizations and the central bank is the S-organization. Our paper 
intends to fill that gap.  
The absence of an autonomous monetary policy, which is an inherent component of a currency 
union, makes national governments dependent on financial markets for their borrowing activities. In 
this respect, their sovereign bond yields become critical because if they are too high, they incur more 
debt. Therefore, a key method for the ECB to soften the budget constraints of member states without 
explicitly violating the prohibition of monetary state financing is to keep sovereign bond yields lower 




The ECB non-standard monetary policy measures are the independent variables for our paper. There 
are two ways to quantify monetary policy measures. First, when monetary policies embody unique 
actions that can be pinpointed to specific dates, they can be regarded as singular events, such as the 
reduction of an interest rate to a new level or the start of an asset-buying program. These measures can 
be modelled as event dummy variables. Second, policy measures can be represented by stock or flow 
values, such as the volume of purchases under an asset-buying program. To account for both types of 
data, two different datasets are created for the benchmark estimations: one containing monetary policy 
events in the form of dummy variables and the other the volume of sovereign bond purchases under 
the SMP.  
The event dummies dataset is in daily frequency and covers the timespan from 1 January 2007 to 
31 December 2013, roughly the period of the unconventional monetary policy interventions.9 Because 
SMP purchase volumes are only available on a weekly frequency, their dataset is also weekly. It covers 
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the time period corresponding to the lifespan of the SMP (May 2010-September 2012). Ideally, the 
estimation sample would include all Eurozone economies, but this is constrained by data availability. 
Thus, the dataset includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which compose the group of crisis 
countries, and Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, which are the non-
crisis countries.  
Benchmark estimations are complemented by robustness checks employing government debt as 
the dependent variable. Because this data is only available in quarterly frequency, a new robustness 
check dataset is constructed. The timespans for estimations correspond to those of the benchmark 
estimations. As a dependent variable we use ten-year sovereign bond spreads. These spreads are 
constructed from ten-year bond yields and the Euro swap rate, both obtained from Datastream. The 
Euro swap rate rather than German bonds are used because it allows the inclusion of Germany 
(Kilponen, et al., 2015). We could also use bond yields as the dependent variable, but spreads arguably 
capture the risk element better than yields as they are measured with respect to the risk-free rate.10 
The event dummies contain the most important monetary policy measures conducted during 
the crisis: the SMP, the various announcements related to the OMT, several non-standard LTRO 
operations, the lowering of the rate on the ECB’s deposit facility to 0%, and both rounds of the CBPP.11 
The selection of these event dummies is guided by common choices in the literature (see sources listed 
in Table A.1 in the appendix). The selection of the SMP is quite obvious as it is the only publicly known, 
official bond-buying program targeting sovereigns before the PSPP started in March 2015.12 The OMT is 
selected because of its importance; despite being rather controversial, it was also quite effective 
(Altavilla et al., 2014). The non-standard LTROs have often been used to buy sovereign bonds and can 
therefore be considered an indirect program for purchasing sovereign debt (Krishnamurthy, et al., 
2014). The 0%-deposit rate marks a historical low since the interest rate has never before been this low 
since the establishment of the Eurosystem (European Central Bank, 2015c). The CBPPs are also included 
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even though they targeted banks rather than governments (Kilponen, et al., 2015). The decisions on the 
EFSF and ESM are added to the set of dummy variables as controls. Table A.1 in the appendix presents 
a list of all event dummy variables. 
The second benchmark dataset includes SMP purchase volumes as the dependent variable. 
Unfortunately, the country-specific daily volumes of sovereign bond purchases under the SMP are still 
classified by the ECB, which does not publish such detailed data.13 Thus, the only studies that use these 
data are written by ECB experts (Eser and Schwaab, 2015; Ghysels et al., 2014). However, the British 
bank Barclays approximates the weekly country-specific purchase volumes under the SMP (Barclays 
Capital, 2012). Specifically, Barclays assumes the “total weekly cash purchase number (and weekly 
redemptions)” published by the ECB are split proportionally to the countries’ bond market sizes 
(Barclays Capital, 2012: 1). These estimates are then adjusted to ECB announcements and market 
pressures observed by Barclays trading desk (De Pooter, et al., 2015). The resulting dataset appears to 
be very reliable since Barclays “was a significant counterparty to ECB transactions” (De Pooter, et al., 
2015: 9). This dataset is used here to estimate the effect of SMP purchases.14 Because of its weekly 
frequency, all other variables in this dataset were obtained or created at weekly frequency as well.  
The control variables are, like the dependent variable, the same for both datasets (except for the 
EFSF/ESM-control dummy, which is not used in the SMP purchases dataset). The empirical literature 
estimating effects on sovereign bond yields or spreads primarily uses financial market data as control 
variables. This approach is implemented here with the following variables selected as controls: the 
lagged dependent variable (that is, bond yield spreads) in order to eliminate auto-correlation of 
residuals (Szczerbowicz, 2014; Kilponen et al., 2015); the interest rate on the ECB’s marginal lending 
facility15 in percentage points in order to control for its effects on bond yield spreads (Gerlach-Kristen, 
2013); the MSCI Europe to account for the condition of the stock markets (Pattipeilohy et al., 2013); an 
index containing CDS spreads of EU banks to control for the overall condition of the banking sector and 
thus the overall lending conditions (Pattipeilohy et al., 2013); the iTraxx Europe (a European CDS 
index) to control for European risk appetite (Kilponen et al., 2015); and finally the VIX index (which 
enters the estimations in lagged form to avoid simultaneity) to control for overall risk (used by all the 
studies referenced above). All of these variables were obtained from Datastream. The event dummies 
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dataset further contains the aforementioned EFSF/ESM-dummy as a control variable.16 Bond yield 
spreads for crisis and non-crisis countries are presented in Figures 1 and 2.17 Four observations are 
crucial here. First, the convergence of bond yield spreads to very low levels in the pre-crisis period, as 
markets assumed the sovereign default risk to be negligible and equal for all countries. Second, with the 
start of the crisis both the volatility of spreads and the variance of spreads across countries increased, 
which hints at a re-differentiation of sovereign default risk by the financial markets.18 Third, the onset 
of the crisis also saw a divergence of spreads between crisis and non-crisis countries, as the former’s 
spreads embarked on a continuous rise, while the latter’s spreads experienced a much more stable and 
less volatile development—notwithstanding episodes of sharp, sudden increases, though, especially for 
Belgium. Fourth, the strong increase for crisis countries, especially in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, 
resulted in enormously high spread levels that many market participants considered to be a thing of the 
past, ever since the introduction of the Eurosystem. 
Summary statistics of the control variables are presented in Table A.4 in the appendix. Note that 
the higher the CDS indices (the CDS index for EU banks and the iTraxx) and the VIX index climb, the 
greater the associated risk. In view of this, the tenfold increase of each measure between the worst and 
the best of times is quite remarkable. The monetary policy event dummies are described in Table A.1 in 
the appendix. Each dummy variable contains several events (except for the “0% deposit rate”, which 
consists of only one event), which are listed below each other in the second column. (For reasons of 
readability the cells in the first column are left blank for additional events of the same variable.) The 
events are basically self-explanatory; their sources are given in the last column. 
The second independent variable, the volume of purchases under the SMP, is displayed in 
Figures 3 and 4. The two phases of the SMP (first the introduction, then its reactivation; see Table A.1 in 
the appendix) are clearly visible in Figure 3. The different purchase volumes across countries and the 
change in geographical focus between the two phases are displayed in Figure 4. At the start of the SMP, 
the ECB only bought bonds from Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. The reactivation phase saw the buying 
of primarily Italian and Spanish bonds. Overall, the magnitude of weekly purchases at the peak time 
exceeded 20 billion euros. 
To corroborate the findings of the benchmark estimations, robustness checks with government 
debt as the dependent variable are implemented. This requires the construction of an additional dataset. 
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For this, central rather than general government debt is used because the latter contains social security 
bodies and sub-national entities whose budgetary decisions are not as responsive to ECB policies. They 
either contain more or less automatic budget decisions (like disbursing insurance or welfare benefits) or 
have a more local political focus. The same rationale is behind a decision to use short-term debt. It is 
more flexible and better suited to react to short-term changes in the political environment. Thus, we use 
the central government short-term debt-to-GDP ratio as our dependent variable. The dataset has a 
quarterly frequency, which is the highest available frequency for sovereign debt data. The debt data is 
obtained from Eurostat and standardized to GDP with data from Datastream.  
The independent variables are adjusted to the quarterly frequency, but otherwise remain the 
same as in the benchmark estimations. Weekly SMP purchases are aggregated into quarters and the 
event dummies take the value of unity in the quarter in which the underlying event takes place (this can 
lead to omission when several events happen in the same quarter). The new dependent variable 
requires a new set of control variables as well. The controls chosen here are in line with Baskaran and 
Hessami (2013), whose study is very helpful here. The lagged debt-to-GDP ratio is included to control 
for path dependency. The inflation rate (calculated as the growth rate of the consumer price index) is 
chosen to control for macroeconomic effects, and the unemployment rate and GDP growth rate to 
control for the effect of overall economic conditions. All control variables were obtained in quarterly 
frequency from Datastream. 
Moreover, we provide some descriptive statistics of the new variables. The central government 
short-term debt-to-GDP ratio is presented in Figure 5. The distribution of the debt level across countries 
is quite diverse: from relatively high (Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and France) to relatively low (Austria, 
Germany, and Finland). It is interesting to observe the absence of Greece, Ireland, and Spain among the 
initial high-debt countries. While Spain headed into the crisis with generally low sovereign debt levels, 
Greece and Ireland had by far the greatest maximum/minimum debt ratio during the observed time 
period; they just started from a very low level (see Table A.5 in the appendix). When it comes to 
volatility, the debt level remained relatively stable for some countries (Austria, Germany, Finland, and 
Italy), whereas Greece and Spain experienced the highest absolute increase.  
The relatively small size of short-term debt compared to total central government debt (which is 
displayed in Table A.6 in the appendix) does not impede its usability in the paper. After all, the 
rationale for choosing short-term debt is not about its magnitude but about its responsiveness to 
political actions. Finally, summary statistics of the control variables are presented in Table A.7 (see 
appendix). The inflation rate is roughly in a similar range in all countries, with a few negative outliers 
12 
in Ireland at the end of 2009. The highest unemployment rate is observed in Spain and Greece and the 
lowest in the Netherlands and pre-crisis Ireland. The growth rate of GDP plummeted in all countries at 
the height of the crisis and became strongly negative. Crisis countries are among those who observed 
the highest growth rates in the pre-crisis period, with Ireland being the fastest growing economy of the 
Eurozone before the beginning of the crisis.   
 











Figure 2 Bond yield spread of ten-year sovereign bonds (crisis countries) 
 





Figure 4 SMP Purchase volumes (crisis countries) 
 
 




IV. Empirical strategy  
Benchmark estimations  
The main hypothesis of this paper is that the ECB non-standard monetary policy measures 
provided Eurozone countries with soft budget constraints by lowering their sovereign bond yield 
spreads. The event dummies dataset is estimated using what is commonly referred to as an “event 
study” design. In this design, the effect of one or more event dummy variables on some stock or flow 
variable is estimated using standard regression techniques.19 The effect of SMP purchase volumes is 
estimated separately, also using standard regressions. The literature related to the empirical part of this 
paper is on monetary policy effectiveness in which the effects of policy measures on bond yields (or 
bond yield spreads) are estimated using both event dummies and SMP purchase volumes.  
Based on daily data, a group of scholars uses ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the effect 
on sovereign bond yields (or spreads) for each Eurozone country separately (Kilponen et al., 2015; 
Altavilla et al., 2014; Krishnamurthy et al.; 2014). Only a few authors, such as Rivolta (2014) and 
Szczerbowicz (2014), additionally provide regressions estimating the effect on a combined sample of all 
countries. The length of the event window (i.e. the number of days over which the event dummy takes 
the value of one) is typically two days, such that the dummy equals one on the day of the event and the 
day after the event. The idea is to account for events that occur shortly before or after markets close and 
thus ensure that the full effect of each event is observed (Altavilla et al., 2014; Kilponen et al., 2015; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2014). Our paper uses country clusters instead of separate estimations for each 
country. To account for different impacts of ECB policies on crisis and non-crisis countries, we run our 
estimations on three different samples: all countries, crisis countries, and non-crisis countries.20 Because 
unit-root tests of sovereign bond yield spreads suggest non-stationarity for the majority of countries 
(see Table A.7 in the appendix), estimations are carried out using the first difference of spreads. The 
event window of the dummy variables comprises two days.21 We use pooled OLS and 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. For policy event dummies, this yields the following 
estimation equation: 
1t t t t ty D X yα β γ δ ε−∆ = + + + ∆ +                                                             (1) 
                                                          
19 See for example Rivolta (2014) for a detailed description of event study designs. 
20 Crisis countries include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (so-called GIIPS countries). Non-crisis 
countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.  
21 Using other event window lengths as robustness checks does not alter the results.  
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where the dependent variable ty∆  is the sovereign bond yield spread, α is a constant, tD  is the set of 
ECB monetary policy dummies, tX  is a set of control variables, which are first-differenced except for 
the EFSF-ESM policy dummy, 1ty −∆  is the lagged dependent variable, and tε  is the error term. The 
parameter  β  gives the effects of the ECB monetary policy measures. Following our hypothesis, it is 
expected that the monetary policy dummies have a negative effect on bond spreads, that is 
0.β <                       (2) 
The methodology used in the literature to examine the effect of SMP purchase volumes is 
considerably more diverse. It ranges from factor analyses (Pattipeilohy et al., 2013) and the estimation 
of purpose-built component models (Ghysels et al., 2014) over seemingly unrelated regressions 
(Gerlach-Kristen, 2013) to panel regression models (De Pooter et al., 2015). Similarly, the data frequency 
ranges from intra-daily (Ghysels, et al., 2014) to weekly (De Pooter, et al., 2015). The same variety is 
found concerning the country samples of the estimations. Some studies estimate separate effects for 
each country (for example Gerlach-Kristen (2013), who only looks at GIIPS countries and Germany), 
while others estimate effects for samples of several countries (De Pooter et al. (2015), who use data for 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, or Eser and Schwaab (2015)). 
The main independent variable is the volume of a country’s bonds purchased under the SMP. 
Hence, contagion effects of SMP purchases of other countries’ bonds are not estimated. Thus, the 
following equation is estimated using pooled OLS and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors:  
1 2 1 1 2                                 (3)t t t t t t ty P P X y yα β β γ δ θ ε− − −∆ = + + + + ∆ + ∆ +  
where the dependent variable ty∆  is the sovereign bond yield spread, α  is a constant, tP and 1tP−  are 
current and lagged volumes of SMP purchases, tX  is a set of first-differenced control variables, 1ty −∆  
and 2ty −∆  are the first and second lags of the dependent variable, and tε  is the error term. The 
parameters 1β  and 2β  give the effect of the SMP purchases. Following our hypothesis, it is expected 
that SMP purchases have a negative effect on bond spreads, i.e. 
1 2, 0.β β <                (4) 
Robustness checks 
The robustness checks using the benchmark datasets (we estimate the effect on bond yields 
instead of bond yield spreads or alter the size of the event window) utilize the same methodology as the 
benchmark estimations. However, the robustness checks using government debt data are different. 
Following our hypothesis, unconventional ECB policies are expected to increase government debt. The 
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transmission channel of the soft budget constraint is treated as a black box here, with the result that we 
can directly estimate the effect on the central government debt. To ensure comparability with the 
benchmark estimations, the same independent variables, country samples, and method (pooled OLS) 
are used. Only the set of control variables and the data frequency change due to the requirements of the 
new dependent variable.  
Thus, the following equation is estimated for monetary policy event dummies: 
1t t t t td D dα β γ δ ε−= + + Ζ + +                                                                  (5) 
where the dependent variable td  is the central government short-term debt-to-GDP ratio in percentage 
points, α  is a constant, tD  is the set of ECB monetary policy dummies, tZ  is a set of control variables 
including a dummy related to the EFSF and ESM,  1td −  is the lagged dependent variable, and tε  is the 
error term. The parameter β  gives the effect of the ECB monetary policies. According to our 
hypothesis, it is expected that the monetary policy dummies have a positive effect on the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, that is  
0.β >           (6) 
For the volume of SMP purchases, the following equation is estimated: 
1 2 1 1t t t t t td P P Z dα β β γ δ ε− −= + + + + +                                                    (7) 
where the dependent variable td  is the central government short-term debt-to-GDP ratio in percentage 
points, α  is a constant, tP  and 1tP−  are current and lagged volumes of SMP purchases, tZ is a set of 
control variables, 1td −  is the lagged dependent variable, and tε  is the error term. The parameters 1β  and 
2β  give the effect of the SMP purchases. According to the hypothesis of this paper, it is expected that 
the SMP purchases have a positive effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio, that is, it is expected that 
1 2, 0.β β >          (8) 
 
 
V. Results  
Benchmark estimations 
The results for the crisis country and non-crisis country samples of the event dummies dataset are 
presented in Table 1.22 The estimation coefficients display the average effect on bond yield spreads for 
each of the events belonging to a certain policy measure; for example, both the announcement and the 
                                                          
22 See Tables A.9 to A.11 in the appendix for detailed estimation outputs of all three samples. The estimation 
results of the sample containing all countries are driven by the crisis countries. 
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reactivation of the SMP lower the bond yield spread of a crisis country on average by roughly half a 
percentage point. 
 
Table 1 Estimation Results for Event Dummies 
 
Dependent variable: Bond yield spreads 
Variable Crisis Non-Crisis 
Bond_yield_spreads 




    D1. -0.0642 *** -0.0283 *** 
MSCI_Europe 
    D1. -0.0003 ** -0.00001 
 CDS_index_EU_banks 
    D1. 0.0037 *** 0.0003 *** 
iTraxx_Europe 
    D1. 0.0069 *** 0.0005 ** 
VIX_index 
    LD. -0.0030 ** -0.0006 * 
OMT -0.1658 *** -0.0346 *** 







CBPP 0.1297 * 0.0089 




 *** p < 0.01     
** p < 0.05     
* p < 0.1     
 
 
As expected, the OMT has a significantly negative effect on bond yield spreads of all the 
countries. But the other policy measures have different impacts on the two country groups. Although 
the SMP lowers bond spreads for crisis countries, it actually has a small positive effect on non-crisis 
countries. This unexpected positive effect can be best explained with the accumulation of risky assets on 
the ECB’s balance sheet caused by the purchase of crisis country bonds. Because non-crisis countries are 
more likely than crisis countries to eventually cover all or part of this risk, particularly against the 
background of a possible exit from the Eurozone of one or more crisis countries, the increased risk on 
the ECB’s balance sheet negatively influences the risk assessment for non-crisis countries by market 
participants and increases their spreads accordingly. LTROs and the lowering of the deposit rate to 0%, 
on the other hand, have a significantly negative effect on non-crisis countries, but are insignificant for 
crisis countries. Again, the different effects are driven by the difference between crisis and non-crisis 
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countries. The deposit rate provides the floor for the interbank money market. Lowering it makes 
money cheaper, as banks are looking for opportunities to invest their money and thus increase their 
volume of credit provision. The more solvent an economy is, the better it can take advantage of this 
cheap money. Therefore, the lowering of the deposit rate to zero percent has a greater effect on non-
crisis countries. Similarly, LTROs provide the banking sector with liquidity. Because banking sectors in 
non-crisis countries are larger and more developed, the liquidity provisions have a greater impact on 
them.  
The coefficient of the CBPP is weakly (and positively) significant for crisis countries, while 
insignificant for non-crisis countries. But this does not contradict our hypothesis, because the CBPP was 
targeted at banks and not sovereigns. The significantly negative coefficient of the EFSF/ESM-control 
variable indicates that the various bailout measures (also called support packages) by EU member 
states could have had the effect of creating SBCs of their own.23 
Altogether, the effects of the ECB’s policy measures on the bond yield spreads confirm the 
hypothesis of a negative β  in equation (2).   
Table 2 provides the results for estimations using the volume of SMP purchases. At first glance, 
the effects of the SMP purchases look fairly small, but this is in part due to the scale of the variable, 
which is millions of euros. As the weekly purchases were often in the order of billions (see Figures 7 
and 8), the effect of purchases worth, for example, ten billion euros lowers spreads by half a percentage 
point. Both the coefficients of the level and the first lag are significant, but only the level’s coefficient is 
negative. In other words, SMP purchases do have a (initially) significantly negative effect on bond 
spreads before a “bounce-back” effect kicks in. This “bounce-back” effect is also observed by Eser and 
Schwaab (2015). Thus, 1β  of equation (4) is indeed negative, but 2β  is positive. The overall effect of SMP 
purchases is significant, but ambivalent. 
 




Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Bond_yield_spreads 
      LD. 0.0408 0.0222 1.840 0.095 -0.0086 0.0902 
L2D. -0.1216 0.0050 -24.400 0.000 -0.1327 -0.1105 
ECB_rate 
      D1. 0.0654 0.1960 0.330 0.746 -0.3713 0.5021 
MSCI_Europe 
      D1. 0.0005 0.0001 6.870 0.000 0.0004 0.0007 
CDS_index_EU_banks 
      D1. 0.0028 0.0010 2.680 0.023 0.0005 0.0051 
iTraxx_Europe 
                                                                
23 This result suggests a new line for further research.  
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D1. 0.0097 0.0060 1.610 0.138 -0.0037 0.0231 
VIX_index 
      LD. -0.0136 0.0052 -2.640 0.025 -0.0251 -0.0021 
SMP_purchases 
      -- -0.00004 0.00002 -2.660 0.024 -0.0001          -7.06e-06 
L1. 0.00005 0.00002 2.660 0.024 7.84e-06 0.0001 
Constant 0.0165 0.0110 1.500 0.166 -0.0081 0.0411 
Number of obs 1298 
     F(9, 10) 19422.12 
     Prob>F 0.0000 
     R-Squared 0.0391 
     Root MSE 0.6902 
     Notes: Std. Err. Adjusted for 11 clusters in country 
    
Combining the results of both datasets, two general findings emerge. First, ECB policies overall 
have a significantly negative effect on bond yield spreads. Second, different policies work differently in 
crisis and non-crisis countries. While the OMT effectively lowers bond yield spreads for both country 
groups, the SMP has the greatest impact in crisis countries, and the zero percent-deposit-rate and 
LTROs have the greatest impact in non-crisis countries. Overall, the hypothesis that the ECB’s 




Several robustness checks of the benchmark estimations are conducted. When using bond yields 
instead of bond yield spreads for both the event dummies and the SMP purchase volumes 
specifications, the results hold (Tables A.12 and A.13 in the appendix). The same is true when the event 
window lengths are varied; the results of the benchmark specifications are confirmed for one-day, 






                                                          
24 The event dummy dataset was also estimated using the difference-in-difference approach. This yielded only 
weak and not very robust results. The most significant effect was achieved by the OMT, which does make sense 
economically, when we assume the OMT had the most lasting effect. (Because difference-in-difference estimates 
permanent effects, one would expect the measure with the most lasting effect to be the most significant.) The 







Table 3 Robustness Check Estimation Results for Event Dummies: Central Government Short-term Debt 
 
Dependent variable: Central government short-term debt 
Variable Crisis Non-Crisis 
Debt_to_GDP_short_term 




 Unemployment_rate -0.0298 
 
0.0013 
 GDP_growth_rate -0.1022 ** -0.0700 
 OMT 1.0189 ** 0.1723 
 SMP -0.0670 
 
0.1577 












 Constant 1.1464 * 0.2418 
 *** p < 0.01     
** p < 0.05     
* p < 0.1     
 
 
The estimation results for event dummies are presented in Table 3.25 Similarly to benchmark 
estimations, the ECB policies have different effects on crisis and non-crisis countries. In crisis countries, 
the OMT has a significantly positive effect on government debt; it increases the debt-to-GDP ratio by 
one percentage point (see also Table A.5 in the appendix). In the non-crisis countries, it is the LTROs 
that have a significantly positive effect. Both findings are meaningful from a substantive standpoint. 
The OMT was directed at crisis countries and it is therefore not surprising that it exhibits the largest 
effect in those countries. LTROs on the other side are more relevant for non-crisis countries, as was 
explained in the previous section. This also holds for their relationship with government debt. 
The negative impact of the CBPP on non-crisis countries (and the insignificant effect on crisis 
countries) is because the CBPP was targeted at banks, and the support of banks by the ECB does not 
automatically send the message to governments that they will be supported in the same way as well. 
Furthermore, aid to banks may have released pressure from government finance (as the ECB stepped 
                                                          
25 See Tables A.17 to A.19 in the appendix for detailed estimation outputs.  
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in, before national governments had to). The “zero percent deposit rate”-dummy is omitted due to 
multicollinearity, which is caused by the change in frequency from daily to quarterly. Moreover, the 
fact that SMP and EFSF/ESM dummies become insignificant is most likely explained by a substantial 
loss of observations. Generally speaking, an event that happens on a specific day will only be significant 
in quarterly data if its effect carries through the entire quarter. This seems to be the case for the OMT 
and LTROs, but not for the SMP. Altogether, the results show that the ECB’s unconventional monetary 
policy increases government debt as expected and thus confirms our hypothesis.  
 
Table 4 Robustness Check Estimation Results for SMP Purchase Volumes: Central Government Short-term Debt 
Debt_to_GDP_short_term Coef. 
Robust  
Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Debt_to_GDP_short_term 
      L1. 0.9174 0.0162 56.630 0.000 0.8813 0.9535 
Inflation_rate 0.0985 0.2158 0.460 0.658 -0.3824 0.5794 
Unemployment_rate 0.0021 0.0137 0.150 0.881 -0.0284 0.0326 
GDP_growth_rate -0.0338 0.0339 -1.000 0.341 -0.1093 0.0416 
SMP_purchases 
      -- -9,57e-06 0.00001 -0.670 0.519 -0.00004 0.00002 
L1. 0.00001 5,76e-06 2.120 0.060 -6,14e-07 0.00003 
Constant 0.1021 0.5316 0.190 0.851 -1.0823 1.2866 
Number of obs 110 
     F(6, 10) 917.82 
     Prob>F 0.0000 
     R-Squared 0.8733 
     Root MSE 1.1641 
     Notes: Std. Err. Adjusted for 11 clusters in country 
    
The effects of the SMP purchase volumes are presented in Table 4. Only the lagged volume is 
significant, but it displays a positive sign.  Hence, there is no bounce-back effect on government debt. 
Even though the SMP purchases increase government debt only modestly, this finding is also in line 




In the wake of the Eurozone crisis, the ECB implemented a variety of monetary policy measures. 
On the one hand, conventional policy instruments were adjusted in response to crisis conditions, for 
example by lowering the deposit rate to zero percent or extending maturities and changing the tender 
and allotment procedures of LTROs and MROs. On the other hand, the ECB introduced asset purchase 
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programs, like the SMP, that directly targeted sovereign bonds. The hypothesis of this paper is that the 
unconventional policy measures softened the budget constraints of Eurozone countries by lowering 
sovereign bond yield spreads. Lowering the costs of debt provided Eurozone countries with incentives 
to further increase sovereign debt.  
This hypothesis is tested using pooled OLS to estimate the effect of two different types of 
monetary policy measures on sovereign bond yield spreads: first, daily event dummies containing 
policy events relating to the OMT, SMP, LTROs, CBPP, and the lowering of the deposit rate to zero 
percent; second, the weekly volume of asset purchases under the SMP. The dataset comprises eleven 
Eurozone countries and the time span of 2007 to 2013 for event dummies and the lifetime of the SMP 
(May 2010 to September 2012) for SMP purchases. Estimations for both types of policy measures yield 
two main findings. First, there is an overall significantly negative effect of the policy measures on bond 
yield spreads. Second, the different policies had dissimilar effects for crisis and non-crisis countries. 
While the OMT effectively lowered bond yield spreads for both country groups, the SMP was most 
effective in crisis countries, and the zero percent-deposit-rate and LTROs were most effective in non-
crisis countries. Altogether, the hypothesis of soft budget constraints caused by the ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policies is accepted.  
This result is confirmed in several robustness checks. Using bond yields instead of bond yield 
spreads and varying the length of the policy dummies’ event windows do not alter the general findings. 
Additionally, the effect of ECB policies on central government short-term debt is directly estimated 
using quarterly data. These estimations yield a significantly positive effect of the policies on 
government debt, thus corroborating the benchmark estimations.  
Overall, the estimations in this paper find that the ECB’s unconventional monetary policies 
during the Eurozone crisis had the unintended consequence of providing Eurozone countries with soft 
budget constraints. Two areas for future research emerge from these findings. First, the need for 
additional research on the unintended effects of rescue policies—not just of the ECB, but also of other 
EU institutions and member states. The significantly negative effect of the EFSF/ESM dummy variable 
on bond yield spreads in the benchmark estimations indicates that various support packages and rescue 
mechanisms may have created soft budget constraints as well. Second, the observation of soft budget 
constraints in the Eurozone caused by the ECB’s crisis response policies reveals the need for theoretical 








Acharya, V. V., Philippon, T., Richardson, M. & Roubini, N., 2009. A Bird's-Eye View: The Financial 
Crisis of 2007-2009 - Causes and Remedies. In: V. V. Acharya & M. Richardson, eds. Restoring Financial 
Stability: How to Repair a Failed System. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., pp. 2-56. 
Altavilla, C., Giannone, D. & Lenza, M., 2014. The Financial and Macroeconomic Effects of OMT 
Announcements. ECB Working Paper No. 1707, Frankfurt: European Central Bank.  
Arestis, P. & Sawyer, M., 2011. The Ongoing Euro Crisis. Challenge, 54 (6), pp. 6-13. 
Arghyrou, M. G. & Kontonikas, A., 2010. The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations 
and contagion. Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2010/9, Cardiff: Cardiff Business School, Cardiff 
University.  
Babczuk, A. & Kachniarz, M., 2012. Sources of Soft Budget Constraints in the Structure of Autonomous 
Public Healthcare Centres. Argumenta Oeconomica, 28 (1), pp. 181-214. 
Barclays Capital, 2012. ECB SMP: Marking to Market. Interest Rate Resarch 6 January 2012.  
Baskaran, T., 2012. Soft budget constraints and strategic interactions in subnational borrowing: 
Evidence from the German States, 1975–2005. Journal of Urban Economics, 71 (1), pp. 114-127. 
Baskaran, T. & Hessami, Z., 2013. Monetary Integration, Soft Budget Constraints, and the EMU 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. University of Konstanz Working Paper Series No. 2013-03, Konstanz: University of 
Konstanz.  
Berglof, E. & Roland, G., 1998. Soft Budget Constraints and Banking in Transition Economies. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 26 (1), pp. 18-40. 
Bernanke, B. S., 2005. The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit. [Online]  
Bernanke, B. S., 2010. Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble. Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association, 3 January, Atlanta, GA. 
Blundell-Wignall, A., Atkinson, P. & Hoon Lee, S., 2008. The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and Policy 
Issues. OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 95 (2008/2).  
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2015. Chronologie der Stabilisierung der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. 
[Online]  
Crivelli, E., Leive, A. & Stratmann, T., 2010. Subnational Health Spending and Soft Budget Constraints 
in OECD Countries. IMF Working Paper No. 10/147, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.  
Dakic, M., 2014. Global Financial Crisis: Policy Response. Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, 3 
(1), pp. 9-26. 
Darvas, Z., 2012. The Euro crisis: Ten roots, but fewer solutions. Bruegel Policy Contribution No. 2012/17, 
Brussels: Bruegel.  
25 
De Pooter, M., Martin, R. F. & Pruitt, S., 2015. The Liquidity Effects of Official Bond Market 
Intervention. International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1138, Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.  
Dewatripont, M. & Maskin, E., 1995. Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies. 
The Review of Economic Studies, 62 (4), pp. 541-555. 
Djankov, S. & Murrell, P., 2002. Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 40 (3), pp. 739-792. 
Eser, F. & Schwaab, B., 2015. Evaluating the impact of unconventional monetary policy measures: 
Empirical evidence from the ECB's Securities Markets Program. Mimeo, Frankfurt: European Central 
Bank, Financial Research.  
European Central Bank, 2009. Purchase program for covered bonds [Press release]. [Online]  
European Central Bank, 2011a. The Monetary Policy of the ECB, Frankfurt: European Central Bank. 
European Central Bank, 2011b. ECB announces details of its new covered bond purchase program (CBPP2) 
[Press release]. [Online]  
European Central Bank, 2012. Financial Stability Review: December 2012, Frankfurt: European Central 
Bank. 
European Central Bank, 2013. Details on securities holdings acquired under the Securities Markets Program 
[Press release]. [Online]  
European Central Bank, 2015a. Asset purchase programs. [Online]  
European Central Bank, 2015b. Open market operations: Non-standard monetary policy measures. [Online]  
European Central Bank, 2015c. Key ECB interest rates. [Online]  
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Washington, DC: 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Fischer, S., 1999. On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 13 (4), pp. 85-104. 
Gerlach-Kristen, P., 2013. Euro area CDS spreads in the crisis: The role of open market operations and 
contagion. ESRI Working Paper No. 449, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).  
Ghysels, E., Idier, J., Manganelli, S. & Vergote, O., 2014. A high frequency assessment of the ECB 
Securities Markets Program. ECB Working Paper No. 1642, Frankfurt: European Central Bank (ECB).  
Grigoriadis, T. Aid Effectiveness and the Soft Budget Constraint: EU Development Aid to the former 
Soviet Union, Economics Letters, Vol. 112, No. 3 (September 2011): 287-289. 
Grigoriadis, T. Aid Effectiveness and Imperfect Monitoring: EU Development Aid as Prisoner’s 
Dilemma”, Rationality & Society, Vol. 25, No. 4 (November 2013): 489-512. 
Jahjah, S., 2000. Inflation, Debt, and Default in a Monetary Union. IMF Working Paper No. 00/179, 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.  
26 
Kilponen, J., Laakkonen, H. & Vilmunen, J., 2015. Sovereign Risk, European Crisis-Resolution Policies, 
and Bond Spreads. International Journal of Central Banking, 11 (2), pp. 285-323. 
Kornai, J., 1979. Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems. Econometrica, 47 (4), pp. 
801-819. 
Kornai, J., 1986. The Soft Budget Constraint. KYKLOS, 39 (1), pp. 3-30. 
Kornai, J., Maskin, E. & Roland, G., 2003. Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 41 (4), pp. 1095-1136. 
Krishnamurthy, A., Nagel, S. & Vissing-Jorgensen, A., 2014. ECB Policies Involving Government Bond 
Purchases: Impact and Channels. Mimeo, Stanford: Stanford University.  
Lane, P. R., 2012. The European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26 (3), pp. 49-68. 
Lenza, M., Pill, H. & Reichlin, L., 2010. Monetary Policy in Exceptional Times. ECB Working Paper Series 
No. 1253, Frankfurt: European Central Bank.  
Merrouche, O. & Nier, E., 2010. What Caused the Global Financial Crisis? Evidence on the Drivers of 
Financial Imbalances 1999-2007. IMF Working Paper No. 10/265, Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund.  
Mitchell, J., 2000. Theories of Soft Budget Constraints and the Analysis of Banking Crises. Economics of 
Transition, 8 (1), pp. 59-100. 
Mody, A. & Sandri, D., 2012. The eurozone crisis: how banks and sovereigns came to be joined at the 
hip. Economic Policy, 27 (70), pp. 199-230. 
Nagel, J., 2015. This is a matter of central bank credibility [Interview] (10 December 2015). 
Pattipeilohy, C. et al., 2013. Unconventional Monetary Policy of the ECB during the Financial Crisis: An 
Assessment and New Evidence. In: M. Balling & E. Gnan, eds. 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and 
Challenges. Vienna: SUERF, pp. 117-155. 
Pettersson-Lidbom, P., 2010. Dynamic Commitment and the Soft Budget Constraint: An Empirical Test. 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2 (3), pp. 154-179. 
Qian, Y. & Roland, G., 1998. Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint. The American Economic Review, 
88 (5), pp. 1143-1162. 
Reinhart, C. M. & Rogoff, K. S., 2008. Is the 2007 US subprime financial crisis so different? An 
international historical comparison. American Economic Review, 98 (2), pp. 339-344. 
Rivolta, G., 2014. An Event Study Analysis of ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy. UNIMI Working 
Paper No. 2014-02, Milan: Dipartimento di Economia, Management e Metodi Quantitativi, Università 
degli Studi di Milano.  
Sester, P., 2012. The ECB’s Controversial Securities Market Program (SMP) and its role in relation to the 
modified EFSF and the future ESM. European Company and Financial Law Review, 9 (2), pp. 156-178. 
27 
Sinelnikov-Murylev, S. G. et al., 2006. Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Soft Budget Constraints of Regional 
Governments. Consortium for Economic Policy Research and Advice Working Paper, Moscow: The Institute 
for the Economy in Transition.  
Szczerbowicz, U., 2014. The ECB's Unconventional Monetary Policies: Have they lowered market 
borrowing costs for banks and governments?. RIETI Discussion Paper No. 14-E-008, Tokyo: Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).  
Taylor, J. B., 2008. The Financial Crisis and the Policy Response: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong. 
s.l., Bank of Canada. 
Taylor, J. B., 2014. Causes of the Financial Crisis and the Slow Recovery: A Ten-Year Perspective. Hoover 
Institution Economics Working Paper No. 14102, Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Hoover Institution.  
White, W. R., 2009. Should Monetary Policy "Lean or Clean"?. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Globalization 
and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper No. 34, Dallas, TX: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.  
Wihlborg, C., Willett, T. D. & Zhang, N., 2010. The Euro Debt Crisis: It isn't just fiscal. World Economics, 
11 (4), pp. 51-77. 
 
Appendix 




















Figure A.2 Bond yields of ten-year sovereign bonds (crisis countries) 
 
29 
Table A.1 Monetary Policy Event Dummies 
Variable Date Description Source(s) 
SMP 10 May 2010 Announcement of the Securities 
Markets Programme 
Kilponen et al. (2015); Krishnamurthy 
et al. (2014); Rivolta (2014); 
Szczerbowicz (2014) 
 7 August 2011 Statement about the active 
implementation of the Securities 
Markets Programme 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2014); Rivolta 
(2014) 
OMT 26 July 2012 Draghi speech “Whatever it takes” in 
London 
Altavilla et al. (2014); Kilponen et al. 
(2015); Krishnamurthy et al. (2014); 
Rivolta (2014); Szczerbowicz (2014) 
 2 August 2012 Press conference announcing 
Outright Monetary Transactions 
Altavilla et al. (2014); Krishnamurthy et 
al. (2014); Rivolta (2014) 
 6 September 2012 Publication of technical features of 
Outright Monetary Transactions 
Altavilla et al. (2014); Kilponen et al. 
(2015); Krishnamurthy et al. (2014); 
Rivolta (2014); Szczerbowicz (2014) 
LTROs 22 August 2007 Announcement of the first 
supplementary LTRO (three-month 
maturity, standard tender and 
allotment procedure) 
Kilponen et al. (2015); Rivolta (2014) 
  6 September 2007 ECB decision to conduct a 
supplementary liquidity-providing 
LTRO with three-month-maturity  
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 28 March 2008 ECB decision on supplementary six-
month LTROs and continuation of the 
supplementary three-month LTROs 
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 15 October 2008 Announcement of several LTROs 
(3/6-month maturity, fixed-rate full 
allotment procedure) 
Kilponen et al. (2015); Rivolta (2014) 
 7 May 2009 ECB decision to conduct liquidity-
providing LTROs with 12-month 
maturity  
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 23 June 2009 Call for bids of a LTRO with 12-
month maturity 
Rivolta (2014) 
 29 September 2009 Call for bids of a LTRO with 12-
month maturity 
Rivolta (2014) 
 15 December 2009 Call for bids of a LTRO with 12-
month maturity 
Rivolta (2014) 
 4 August 2011 ECB decision to conduct a liquidity-
providing supplementary LTRO with 
approximately a six-month maturity 
with a fixed-rate full allotment tender 
procedure  
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 6 October 2011 Announcement of two LTROs with 
12-month maturity 
Kilponen et al. (2015); Rivolta (2014) 
 25 October 2011 Call for bids of a LTRO with 12-
month maturity 
Rivolta (2014) 
 1 December 2011 Draghi speech before European 
parliament, hinting at ECB actions 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) 
 8 December 2011 Announcement of two LTROs with 
36-month maturity 
Kilponen et al. (2015); Krishnamurthy 
et al. (2014); Rivolta (2014); 
Szczerbowicz (2014) 
 21 December 2011 First allotment date for the 36-month 
LTROs 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2014); 
Szczerbowicz (2014) 
 29 February 2012 Second allotment date for the 36-
month LTROs 




5 July 2012 ECB lowers deposit rate to 0% Szczerbowicz (2014) 
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Variable Date Description Source(s) 
CBPPs 7 May 2009 Announcement of the Covered Bond 
Purchase Programme 1 
Rivolta (2014); Szczerbowicz (2014) 
 4 June 2009 Publication of technical details of the 
CBPP1 
Kilponen et al. (2015); Rivolta (2014) 
 6 October 2011 Announcement of the Covered Bond 
Purchase Programme 2 
Kilponen et al. (2015); Rivolta (2014); 
Szczerbowicz (2014) 
 3 November 2011 Publication of technical details of the 
CBPP2 
Rivolta (2014) 
EFSF_ESM 9 May 2010 Decision by EU member states to 
establish EFSF  
Bundesminsterium der Finanzen (2015) 
 28 October 2010 European Council agrees on the need 
to set up a permanent crisis-
resolution mechanism 
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 29 November 2010 Agreement on the key elements of the 
European Stability Mechanism. 
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 16 December 2010 European Council agrees on limited 
amendment to the EU Treaty to 
underpin the permanent mechanism 
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 21 March 2011 Eurogroup+ agrees on the 
organizational and financial details of 
the ESM 
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 20 June 2011 Agreement to increase effective 
capacity and widen the mandate of 
the EFSF 
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 21 July 2011 Widening of the scope of EFSF/ESM Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 29 November 2011 Agreement on two models for 
maximizing the capacity of the EFSF 
(leveraging of EFSF) 
Bundesminsterium der Finanzen (2015) 
 2 February 2012 Treaty establishing the ESM: New 
legal text of the ESM treaty 
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 30 March 2012 The current overall ceiling for 
ESM/EFSF lending, as defined in the 
ESM Treaty, is raised to €700 billion 
such that the ESM and the EFSF will 
be able to operate 
Kilponen et al. (2015) 
 9 July 2012 Eurogroup endorses the ESM 
investment policy guideline 





Table A.2 Summary Statistics of Bond Yield Spreads 
Summary for variables: Bond yield spreads 
 by categories of: Country  
  
      Country mean p50 max min variance 
Austria 0.1252 0.1240 1.242 -0.537 0.0853 
Belgium 0.4552 0.4395 3.171 -0.336 0.3072 
Germany -0.3572 -0.3190 -0.057 -0.834 0.0193 
Spain 1.4685 1.4120 5.842 -0.386 2.3250 
Finland -0.0829 -0.0705 0.524 -0.913 0.0280 
France 0.1041 0.0930 1.175 -0.509 0.0969 
Greece 7.7334 6.4490 37.599 -0.162 76.4179 
Ireland 2.4431 1.8600 11.398 -0.385 5.7037 
Italy 1.4284 1.1100 4.920 -0.182 1.7786 
Netherlands -0.0651 -0.5200 0.493 -0.531 0.0291 
Portugal 3.3106 2.5580 15.058 -0.225 12.5336 
 
Table A.3 Summary Statistics of Bond Yields 
Summary for variables: Bond yields  
  by categories of: Country  
  
      Country mean p50 max min variance 
Austria 3.3569 3.5480 4.920 1.489 0.8251 
Belgium 3.6869 3.9110 5.865 1.932 0.6034 
Germany 2.8745 3.0530 4.675 1.162 1.0491 
Spain 4.7002 4.4540 7.586 3.716 0.5546 
Finland 3.1488 3.3370 4.905 1.350 0.9793 
France 3.3358 3.4550 4.853 1.670 0.6286 
Greece 10.9652 8.6480 39.850 4.142 64.8983 
Ireland 5.6748 4.8080 14.552 3.429 4.1240 
Italy 4.6602 4.5070 7.311 3.663 0.4420 
Netherlands 3.1666 3.3680 4.859 1.493 0.9098 







Table A.4 Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
Variable mean p50 max min variance 
ECB_rate 1.9093 1.0000 5.360 0.250 2.2662 
MSCI_Europe 1511.1700 1454.6350 2235.356 794.232 100524.0000 
CDS_index_EU_banks 257.1033 247.8380 552.179 51.822 12122.8000 
iTraxx_Europe 106.5441 104.5300 215.917 20.094 1840.2360 
VIX_index 22.8974 20.0800 80.860 9.890 111.1926 
 
 
Table A.5 Summary Statistics of the Central Government Short-term Debt-to-GDP Ratio 
Summary for variables: Debt to GDP short term 
  by categories of: Country 
    
      Country mean p50 max min variance 
Austria 3.0500 2.8500 6.400 0.800 1.3804 
Belgium 11.0500 11.2500 16.900 6.500 5.2856 
Germany 2.9357 3.2000 4.400 1.500 0.9453 
Spain 5.2214 5.8000 7.900 1.300 3.7655 
Finland 2.9643 2.6000 6.200 0.900 2.1216 
France 8.1107 8.5000 11.500 4.000 5.2365 
Greece 5.1179 4.5500 9.500 0.400 7.5845 
Ireland 5.8071 3.1500 17.100 0.500 25.6133 
Italy 9.4286 9.4000 11.200 8.000 0.6680 
Netherlands 6.6500 5.9000 13.200 2.700 6.5641 








Table A.6 Summary Statistics of the Central Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio (All Maturities) 
Summary for variables: Debt to GDP 
   by categories of: Country 
    
      Country mean p50 max min variance 
Austria 61.9714 64.6000 67.800 51.700 20.9629 
Belgium 81.9857 83.6000 87.700 73.600 16.8613 
Germany 40.2500 41.4500 43.000 36.000 7.0811 
Spain 47.2179 47.2000 72.200 27.600 215.6541 
Finland 35.3821 37.4000 45.000 24.100 38.5141 
France 60.2214 62.5500 69.900 48.600 53.8899 
Greece 98.6679 101.2000 133.200 48.100 858.7674 
Ireland 47.0929 51.7000 71.000 18.600 262.6822 
Italy 93.6286 95.2000 107.800 80.200 74.7732 
Netherlands 44.7893 46.0000 54.600 33.900 41.4610 




Table A.7 Summary Statistics of Control Variables (Robustness Checks Dataset) 
Country variable mean p50 max min variance 
Austria Inflation_rate 2.2041 2.1990 3.772 0.202 0.9616 
 
Unemployment_rate 6.7838 6.8405 7.947 5.454 0.3418 
 
GDP_growth_rate 1.0379 1.3290 5.526 -5.969 7.3815 
Belgium Inflation_rate 2.2790 2.4945 5.694 -1.141 2.4670 
 
Unemployment_rate 7.7023 7.7500 8.500 6.933 0.2814 
 
GDP_growth_rate 0.9363 0.9520 3.599 -3.841 4.2267 
Germany Inflation_rate 1.7053 1.8245 3.119 -0.207 0.6744 
 
Unemployment_rate 7.6107 7.6000 9.467 6.800 0.5829 
 
GDP_growth_rate 1.0510 1.5455 5.575 -6.923 10.9258 
Spain Inflation_rate 2.2066 2.4355 4.922 -0.994 2.2355 
 
Unemployment_rate 18.5131 19.9835 26.233 7.967 40.1833 
 
GDP_growth_rate -0.5627 -1.1375 4.064 -4.263 6.1100 
Finland Inflation_rate 2.2221 2.4300 4.641 -1.000 2.0724 
 
Unemployment_rate 7.6833 7.8500 8.833 6.200 0.6412 
 
GDP_growth_rate 0.1036 0.7550 5.765 -9.352 19.0471 
France Inflation_rate 1.5481 1.5910 3.288 -0.398 0.8505 
 
Unemployment_rate 8.6321 8.8110 9.978 6.867 0.8588 
 
GDP_growth_rate 0.6432 1.0600 2.927 -3.952 3.4208 
Greece Inflation_rate 2.4148 2.6045 5.550 -2.253 3.8982 
 
Unemployment_rate 15.5039 12.6055 27.814 7.545 58.0401 
 
GDP_growth_rate -3.7596 -3.7925 5.128 -10.200 19.5667 
Ireland Inflation_rate 1.1945 1.7245 5.066 -6.025 10.0918 
 
Unemployment_rate 11.3678 13.1500 15.100 4.567 15.4808 
 
GDP_growth_rate 0.3347 0.7260 7.838 -7.550 15.3261 
Italy Inflation_rate 2.0761 1.8800 4.014 0.187 1.0115 
 
Unemployment_rate 8.5922 8.2200 12.384 5.923 4.1450 
 
GDP_growth_rate -1.0576 -1.0240 2.359 -7.179 7.1523 
Netherlands Inflation_rate 1.9827 2.0310 3.198 0.277 0.5062 
 
Unemployment_rate 5.0381 4.9000 7.633 3.600 1.3597 
 
GDP_growth_rate 0.4531 0.7410 4.234 -4.473 5.9753 
Portugal Inflation_rate 1.7605 2.2525 3.831 -1.404 2.4564 
 
Unemployment_rate 12.2440 12.0750 17.285 8.601 8.4619 
 






Table A.8 Unit-root Tests for Bond Yield Spreads 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test   
H0: following variable is non-stationary:   
Bond_yield_spreads   
  


















Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Bond_yield_spreads 
      LD. 0.0203 0.0352 0.580 0.565 -0.0487 0.0892 
ECB_rate 
      D1. -0.0642 0.0183 -3.510 0.000 -0.1001 -0.0283 
MSCI_Europe 
      D1. -0.0003 0.0001 -2.140 0.033 -0.0006 -0.00002 
CDS_index_EU_banks 
      D1. 0.0037 0.0007 5.450 0.000 0.0024 0.0051 
iTraxx_Europe 
      D1. 0.0069 0.0013 5.120 0.000 0.0042 0.0095 
VIX_index 
      LD. -0.0030 0.0014 -2.220 0.027 -0.0057 -0.0004 
OMT -0.1658 0.0484 -3.430 0.001 -0.2606 -0.0710 
SMP -0.4635 0.1727 -2.680 0.007 -0.8019 -0.1250 
LTROs 0.0034 0.0339 0.100 0.920 -0.0630 0.0699 
zero_deposit_rate 0.0557 0.0442 1.260 0.207 -0.0309 0.1423 
CBPP 0.1297 0.0787 1.650 0.100 -0.0247 0.2841 
EFSF_ESM -0.0540 0.0326 -1.660 0.098 -0.1179 0.0099 
Constant 0.0032 0.0037 0.870 0.386 -0.0040 0.0104 
Number of obs 7885 
     F(12, 7872) 17.03 
     Prob>F 0.0000 
     R-Squared 0.0403 
     Root MSE 0.3224 
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Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Bond_yield_spreads 
      LD. -0.1767 0.0342 -5.160 0.000 -0.2437 -0.1096 
ECB_rate 
      D1. -0.0283 0.0106 -2.670 0.008 -0.0491 -0.0075 
MSCI_Europe 
      D1. -0.00001 0.00003 -0.450 0.651 -0.0001 0.00005 
CDS_index_EU_banks 
      D1. 0.0003 0.0001 4.110 0.000 0.0002 0.0005 
iTraxx_Europe 
      D1. 0.0005 0.0002 2.580 0.010 0.0001 0.0009 
VIX_index 
      LD. -0.0006 0.0003 -1.800 0.072 -0.0012 0.00005 
OMT -0.0346 0.0094 -3.670 0.000 -0.0530 -0.0161 
SMP 0.0422 0.0166 2.540 0.011 0.0096 0.0748 
LTROs -0.0106 0.0060 -1.780 0.076 -0.0224 0.0011 
zero_deposit_rate -0.0530 0.0197 -2.690 0.007 -0.0915 -0.0144 
CBPP 0.0089 0.0065 1.370 0.170 -0.0038 0.0217 
EFSF_ESM -0.0182 0.0062 -2.930 0.003 -0.0305 -0.0060 
Constant 0.0007 0.0004 1.530 0.126 -0.0002 0.0015 
Number of obs 9462 
     F(12, 9449) 9.76 
     Prob>F 0.0000 
     R-Squared 0.0509 
     Root MSE 0.0438 








Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Bond_yield_spreads 
      LD. 0.0210 0.0345 0.610 0.542 -0.0465 0.0886 
ECB_rate 
      D1. -0.0450 0.0104 -4.330 0.000 -0.0653 -0.0246 
MSCI_Europe 
      D1. -0.0002 0.0001 -2.300 0.022 -0.0003 -0.00002 
CDS_index_EU_banks 
      D1. 0.0019 0.0003 5.920 0.000 0.0012 0.0025 
iTraxx_Europe 
      D1. 0.0034 0.0007 5.080 0.000 0.0021 0.0047 
VIX_index 
      LD. -0.0018 0.0007 -2.700 0.007 -0.0032 -0.0005 
OMT -0.0932 0.0269 -3.470 0.001 -0.1459 -0.0406 
SMP -0.1866 0.0941 -1.980 0.047 -0.3711 -0.0022 
LTROs -0.0041 0.0159 -0.260 0.798 -0.0351 0.0270 
zero_deposit_rate -0.0050 0.0286 -0.180 0.860 -0.0611 0.0511 
CBPP 0.0623 0.0366 1.700 0.089 -0.0095 0.1341 
EFSF_ESM -0.0328 0.0162 -2.020 0.043 -0.0646 -0.0010 
Constant 0.0018 0.0017 1.040 0.300 -0.0016 0.0051 
Number of obs 17347 
     F(12, 17334) 17.53 
     Prob>F 0.0000 
     R-Squared 0.0209 
     Root MSE 0.2219 




Table A.12 Estimation Results for Event Dummies: Bond Yields as Dependent Variable (Comparison of Different 
Estimation Samples) 
 
Dependent variable: Bond yields 
 
All Crisis Non-Crisis 
Bond_yields 






      D1. -0.0154 
 
-0.0347 * 0.0004 
 MSCI_Europe 
      D1. 0.0005 *** 0.0003 ** 0.0006 *** 
CDS_index_EU_banks 
      D1. 0.0019 *** 0.0037 *** 0.0003 *** 
iTraxx_Europe 
      D1. 0.0018 *** 0.0053 *** -0.0010 *** 
VIX_index 





OMT -0.0700 *** -0.1427 *** -0.0095 
 SMP -0.2428 ** -0.5212 *** -0.0127 





















*** p < 0.01 
 
 
    ** p < 0.05 
 
 
    * p < 0.1 
 
 








Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Bond_yields 
      LD. 0.0374 0.0267 1.400 0.191 -0.0220 0.0969 
L2D. -0.1148 0.0053 -21.810 0.000 -0.1265 -0.1031 
ECB_rate 
      D1. 0.1107 0.1909 0.580 0.575 -0.3146 0.5361 
MSCI_Europe 
      D1. 0.0016 0.0001 18.190 0.000 0.0014 0.0018 
CDS_index_EU_banks 
      D1. 0.0035 0.0010 3.320 0.008 0.0011 0.0058 
iTraxx_Europe 
      D1. 0.0082 0.0061 1.350 0.207 -0.0053 0.0217 
VIX_index 
      LD. -0.0138 0.0053 -2.610 0.026 -0.0256 -0.0020 
SMP_purchases 
      -- -0.00005 0.00002 -2.920 0.015 -0.0001 -0.00001 
L1. 0.00005 0.00002 2.750 0.021 9.18e-06 0.0001 
Constant 0.0036 0.0110 0.330 0.748 -0.0208 0.0281 
Number of obs 1298 
     F(9, 10) 1265.06 
     Prob>F 0.0000 
     R-Squared 0.0297 
     Root MSE 0.6874 
     Note: Std. Err adjusted for 11 clusters in country 
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Table A.14 Comparing Different Event Window Lengths (All Countries) 
 Event window length - All countries 
Variable One day Two days Three days Five days 
Bond_yield_spreads 








        D1. -0.0450 *** -0.0450 *** -0.0462 *** -0.0437 *** 
MSCI_Europe 
        D1. -0.0002 ** -0.0002 ** -0.0002 ** -0.0001 * 
CDS_index_EU_banks 
       D1. 0.0018 *** 0.0019 *** 0.0018 *** 0.0018 *** 
iTraxx_Europe 
        D1. 0.0033 *** 0.0034 *** 0.0036 *** 0.0038 *** 
VIX_index 
        LD. -0.0016 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0021 *** 
SMP_1 -0.3141 * 
      OMT_1 -0.0433 
       LTROs_1 0.0485 * 
      zero_deposit_rate_1 0.0295 
       CBPP_1 0.0489 
       EFSF_ESM_1 -0.0333 
       OMT 
  
-0.0932 *** 
    SMP 
  
-0.1866 ** 
    LTROs 
  
-0.0041 
     zero_deposit_rate 
  
-0.0050 
     CBPP 
  
0.0623 * 
    EFSF_ESM 
  
-0.0328 ** 
    SMP_3 
    
-0.1256 * 
  OMT_3 
    
-0.0546 ** 
  LTROs_3 
    
-0.0036 
   zero_deposit_rate_3 
    
-0.0007 
   CBPP_3 
    
0.0493 ** 
  EFSF_ESM_3 
    
-0.0116 
   SMP_5 
      
-0.0825 ** 
OMT_5 
      
-0.0515 *** 
LTROs_5 
      
0.0130 
 zero_deposit_rate_5 
      
-0.0134 
 CBPP_5 
      
0.0367 ** 
EFSF_ESM_5 
      
-0.0136 







 *** p < 0.01 
        ** p < 0.05 
        * p < 0.1 
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Table A.15 Comparing Different Event Window Lengths (Crisis Countries) 
 Event window length - Crisis countries 
Variable One day Two days Three days Five days 
Bond_yield_spreads 








        D1. -0.0638 *** -0.0642 *** -0.0665 *** -0.0614 *** 
MSCI_Europe 
        D1. -0.0003 ** -0.0003 ** -0.0003 ** -0.0002 
 CDS_index_EU_banks 
       D1. 0.0036 *** 0.0037 *** 0.0036 *** 0.0036 *** 
iTraxx_Europe 
        D1. 0.0066 *** 0.0069 *** 0.0073 *** 0.0078 *** 
VIX_index 
        LD. -0.0025 ** -0.0030 ** -0.0039 ** -0.0038 ** 
SMP_1 -0.7861 ** 
      OMT_1 -0.0773 
       LTROs_1 0.0856 
       zero_deposit_rate_1 0.0757 
       CBPP_1 0.1208 
       EFSF_ESM_1 -0.0567 
       OMT 
  
-0.1658 *** 
    SMP 
  
-0.4635 *** 
    LTROs 
  
0.0034 
     zero_deposit_rate 
  
0.0557 
     CBPP 
  
0.1297 * 
    EFSF_ESM 
  
-0.0540 * 
    SMP_3 
    
-0.3077 ** 
  OMT_3 
    
-0.1121 ** 
  LTROs_3 
    
-0.0012 
   zero_deposit_rate_3 
    
0.0350 
   CBPP_3 
    
0.0929 * 
  EFSF_ESM_3 
    
-0.0142 
   SMP_5 
      
-0.1889 ** 
OMT_5 
      
-0.0977 *** 
LTROs_5 
      
0.0300 
 zero_deposit_rate_5 
      
-0.0039 
 CBPP_5 
      
0.0658 * 
EFSF_ESM_5 
      
-0.0158 







 *** p < 0.01 
        ** p < 0.05 
        * p < 0.1 
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Table A.16 Comparing Different Event Window Lengths (Non-crisis Countries) 
 Event window length - Non-crisis countries 
Variable One day Two days Three days Five days 
Bond_yield_spreads 
        LD. -0.1722 *** -0.1767 *** -0.1800 *** 0.0231 
 ECB_rate 
        D1. -0.0287 *** -0.0283 *** -0.0286 *** -0.0614 *** 
MSCI_Europe 








       D1. 0.0004 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0036 *** 
iTraxx_Europe 
        D1. 0.0006 *** 0.0005 ** 0.0005 ** 0.0078 *** 
VIX_index 
        LD. -0.0005 * -0.0006 * -0.0005 
 
-0.0038 ** 
SMP_1 0.0651 *** 
      OMT_1 -0.0150 
       LTROs_1 0.0137 * 
      zero_deposit_rate_1 -0.0038 
       CBPP_1 -0.0030 
       EFSF_ESM_1 -0.0168 ** 
      OMT 
  
-0.0346 *** 
    SMP 
  
0.0422 ** 
    LTROs 
  
-0.0106 * 
    zero_deposit_rate 
  
-0.0530 *** 
    CBPP 
  
0.0089 
     EFSF_ESM 
  
-0.0182 *** 
    SMP_3 
    
0.0269 ** 
  OMT_3 
    
-0.0116 
   LTROs_3 
    
-0.0084 * 
  zero_deposit_rate_3 
    
-0.0346 ** 
  CBPP_3 
    
0.0164 *** 
  EFSF_ESM_3 
    
-0.0124 *** 
  SMP_5 
      
-0.1889 ** 
OMT_5 
      
-0.0977 *** 
LTROs_5 
      
0.0300 
 zero_deposit_rate_5 
      
-0.0039 
 CBPP_5 
      
0.0658 * 
EFSF_ESM_5 
      
-0.0158 







 *** p < 0.01 
        ** p < 0.05 
        * p < 0.1 
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Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Debt_to_GDP_short_term 
      L1. 0.8686 0.0475 18.290 0.000 0.7747 0.9626 
Inflation_rate 0.0750 0.1046 0.720 0.475 -0.1320 0.2820 
Unemployment_rate -0.0298 0.0195 -1.530 0.129 -0.0683 0.0088 
GDP_growth_rate -0.1022 0.0447 -2.280 0.024 -0.1907 -0.0136 
OMT 1.0189 0.4827 2.110 0.037 0.0635 1.9743 
SMP -0.0670 0.6363 -0.110 0.916 -1.3262 1.1923 
LTROs 0.1943 0.3185 0.610 0.543 -0.4360 0.8246 
zero_deposit_rate 0.0000  (omitted) 
    CBPP 0.5985 0.6240 0.960 0.339 -0.6365 1.8334 
EFSF_ESM -0.6191 0.4077 -1.520 0.131 -1.4259 0.1877 
Constant 1.1464 0.6220 1.840 0.068 -0.0845 2.3773 
Number of obs 135 
     F(9, 125) 78.63 
     Prob>F 0.0000 
     R-Squared 0.8304 
     Root MSE 1.4260 











Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Debt_to_GDP_short_term 
      L1. 0.9327 0.0316 29.520 0.000 0.8703 0.9951 
Inflation_rate 0.0546 0.1116 0.490 0.625 -0.1659 0.2751 
Unemployment_rate 0.0013 0.1124 0.010 0.991 -0.2208 0.2235 
GDP_growth_rate -0.0700 0.0445 -1.570 0.118 -0.1580 0.0179 
OMT 0.1723 0.2771 0.620 0.535 -0.3752 0.7199 
SMP 0.1577 0.2966 0.530 0.596 -0.4283 0.7436 
LTROs 0.6853 0.2708 2.530 0.012 0.1502 1.2204 
zero_deposit_rate 0.0000 (omitted) 
    CBPP -1.2220 0.4370 -2.800 0.006 -2.0853 -0.3587 
EFSF_ESM -0.2948 0.2800 -1.050 0.294 -0.8479 0.2584 
Constant 0.2418 0.8919 0.270 0.787 -1.5203 2.0039 
Number of obs 162 
     F(9, 152) 144.22 
     Prob>F 0.0000 
     R-Squared 0.8769 











Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Debt_to_GDP_short_term 
      L1. 0.9150 0.0247 36.990 0.000 0.8663 0.9637 
Inflation_rate 0.0978 0.0773 1.260 0.207 -0.0544 0.2500 
Unemployment_rate -0.0082 0.0132 -0.620 0.533 -0.0342 0.0177 
GDP_growth_rate -0.0749 0.0291 -2.580 0.010 -0.1321 -0.0177 
OMT 0.5615 0.2849 1.970 0.050 0.0008 1.1221 
SMP 0.0579 0.3338 0.170 0.863 -0.5992 0.7149 
LTROs 0.4937 0.2059 2.400 0.017 0.0885 0.8989 
zero_deposit_rate 0.0000 (omitted) 
    CBPP -0.3699 0.3986 -0.930 0.354 -1.1544 0.4145 
EFSF_ESM -0.4822 0.2338 -2.060 0.040 -0.9424 -0.0221 
Constant 0.4221 0.2772 1.520 0.129 -0.1235 0.9677 
Number of obs 297 
     F(9, 287) 183.00 
     Prob>F 0.0000 
     R-Squared 0.8547 
     Root MSE 1.3684 
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